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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A SURVIVALIST GUIDE TO TEACHING ERISA †

DAVID M. FRANKFORD* AND SARA ROSENBAUM**
It is certainly not news that teaching ERISA 1 is one of the most
challenging tasks that a health law professor faces. Each year when your
authors perform this labor of love-hate, particularly when we begin to teach
ERISA preemption, we exchange emails describing how our students look like
deer frozen in the headlights of an oncoming car. We write this article to
describe how we try to move them out of those lights and into safety.
Teaching ERISA is so hard because, quite frankly, nothing makes sense.
The doctrine itself reveals the basic contradiction of relying primarily on a
voluntary, employer-provided health insurance system to insure approximately
sixty percent of our nonelderly population 2 while simultaneously imposing
regulation on that system and somehow trying to avoid its demise. The ACA
did almost nothing to address this dilemma and so our society, including our
legal regime, remains stuck between a rock and a hard place. In teaching this
contradiction, we have found that the best one can do is to teach the students
the arguments that can be made with regard to particular issues and the policy
choices that are available to resolve them. We ask that students not kill the
messengers.

† We are grateful to the decades of students who have had to endure not only the insanity
of ERISA doctrine but our teaching thereof.
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School; Professor, Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, and
Aging Research, Rutgers University; Faculty Director at Camden, Center for State Health Policy,
Rutgers University.
** Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor of Health Law and Policy and Founding Chair of the
Department of Health Policy, George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public
Health.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified in part at 29 U.S.C. ch. 18).
2. Employer-Sponsored Coverage Rates for the Nonelderly by Age, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/rate-by-age-2/?currentTimeframe=0&selected
Rows=%7B%22nested%22:%7B%22all%22:%7B%7D%7D%7D [https://perma.cc/92RQ-EV
9P].
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I. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INCOHERENCE
It is important from the start that students understand two fundamental
points. First, they must grasp that ERISA governs all private employersponsored health insurance (other than church plans) while it simultaneously
does not require that employers offer any health insurance at all. Students often
find this to be confusing—who wouldn’t? Some think that employers can opt
into ERISA, that there are two kinds of employer-sponsored insurance—one
flavor covered by ERISA, one not. To dispel any such confusion, it is crucial
to stress the subjunctive: if a private employer of any size offers health
insurance, then that plan is governed by ERISA.
The significance of this subjunctive looms large for ERISA doctrine, for it
is the root of the settlor function: “if the plan sponsor promises this, then . . . .”
Protected above all else, therefore, is the settlor’s unfettered right over plan
design—leaving aside any mandate imposed by ERISA itself, whether directly
or incorporated by reference, or by state law where relevant: “if the plan
sponsor promises this, then it is promised unless the plan sponsor decides to
change plan design, in which case it is then ‘un-promised.’” 3 Our students
advance out of the first year only by learning the converse in contracts: “If A
promises something and then fails to perform that promise, then A stands in
breach of contract.” Do you mean that ERISA displaces ordinary notions of
contract? Yes, Virginia, there is no Santa Claus. 4
Second, students need to understand that ERISA’s application to health
care is a misfit, stemming from the fact that employer-sponsored health benefit
plans were suddenly—and without much reflection or discussion—grafted
onto legislation designed to shore up employer-provided pensions. The
problem is that pension plans and health benefit plans simply are different
animals. Health insurance protects against a vast array of illnesses, each of
which may likewise command a large number of treatment options, with the
result that the number of contingencies leading to claims, and indeed the
number of those claims and the variation among the magnitude of loss for each
one, far eclipse the contingencies leading to payouts from a pension system
and the numbers and amounts of those payouts.
The result is that the scope of discretion with regard to pensions and health
insurance differs greatly. Pension administration requires the exercise of
discretion with regard to contributions, investments, and distributions—a fairly
limited universe. The latter, in particular, is much more circumscribed in
pension administration than in the administration of health insurance. Pension
benefits are usually payable upon retirement or death and in the form of a
3. See the discussion below of McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991),
infra note 10.
4. See Yes, Virginia, There Is a Santa Claus, NEWSEUM, http://www.newseum.org/exhibits/
online/yes-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/ABN9-AEB2].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

A SURVIVALIST GUIDE TO TEACHING ERISA

497

lump-sum distribution or annuity benefit, while the reasons for payment of a
health insurance benefit are as vast as the number of stars in the sky. Pension
benefits can therefore be relatively fully described in legal language; by
contrast, open-ended language—”medically reasonable and necessary”—must
be used to define health insurance benefits. As a result, one can point to a
relatively discrete set of organic documents that together comprise the pension
“plan,” i.e., the contingencies that determine whether a benefit is due and its
amount. By contrast, no set of documents so defines health insurance benefits.
The plan is defined only in the course of its administration, which is spread
among a wide array of functions that are often splintered among a large cast of
characters: claims processing, utilization review, actuarial services,
information technology services, behavioral health services, pharmacy benefit
management services, and internal claims appeals, among others. Much of the
ERISA doctrine depends on distinguishing between tasks that are
discretionary—inside “the plan”—and those that are ministerial—outside “the
plan.” Given that this discretion pervades the definition of health insurance
benefits and ultimately reaches and potentially influences the very treatment
decisions that health care providers may select—e.g., whether to manage a
condition medically or perform surgery; whether to admit a high-risk pregnant
patient to a hospital or manage her care at home; whether to provide treatment
on an inpatient or outpatient basis—distinctions between “the plan” and the
outside are mostly meaningless. Students in search of rational distinctions find
none. Deer in the headlights.
As we will describe below, as the material progresses, students need to
learn a third fundamental point. The rhetoric of ERISA promulgators—and still
extant defenders against state encroachment 5—is that ERISA provides
comprehensive regulation of health benefits, thereby justifying and leading to
vast preemption of state authority over employer plans. However, ERISA
actually provides very little regulation, with the result that the vast preemption
of state law leaves nothing but a federal vacuum. Even in the case of ERISA
plans that involve the purchase of state-regulated group insurance coverage,
the scope of preemption over rights and remedies is enormous. In the case of
self-insured plans—which account for most workers covered by employer
plans—the effects of preemption are truly breathtaking.
II. THE UNREAL SUBSTANCE OF ERISA
It is important to note that section 502 of ERISA creates an express cause
of action for plan beneficiaries and participants (in contrast to, say, the PHSA,

5. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 946 (2016).
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the ACA, and the Medicaid statute). 6 Moreover, we point out how limited the
explicit monetary remedies are circumscribed to “benefits due,” omitting, most
importantly, consequential damages available under state common law
remedies, much less the penal damages often available under state law for bad
faith breach of contract. Additionally, while the equitable remedies promised
appear to be strong, they are quite limited, although Cigna v. Amara 7 and
subsequent cases 8 perhaps signal that the courts will offer make-whole
monetary remedies at least to some extent. Just with regard to remedies, the
ERISA “contract” or “trust” is fairly hollow.
Indeed, it is ERISA’s imposition of a fiduciary obligation to protect plan
members that appears most promising, although in the end, like ERISA’s
promise of benefits due, it is a false promise. Firestone, 9 of course, is the most
important case. It is important to have the students lay out Justice O’Connor’s
ode to the comprehensive, remedial nature of ERISA’s protection of plan
members, and then follow that immediately with how her right hand took away
what the left gave. What kind of trust is this? The students generally see quite
readily how odd it is that a “fiduciary” gets to rewrite its own powers. Then,
with McGann, 10 what kind of contract is this? “I promise you benefits until I
change this promise.” Students are generally fairly outraged at McGann’s
plight, and this outrage can be channeled to show the perilous nature of our
employer-provided health insurance system.
Moreover, isn’t it one thing for a plan sponsor to reserve a deferential
standard of review to itself, while quite another for plan sponsors to write all
sorts of medically unjustifiable practice guidelines directly into the plan and
thereby effectively insulate themselves from liability for failure to provide
benefits that appear to be promised by the plan? 11 Push it to the max:
Plan sponsor reserves the right to amend the plan at any time for any reason.
We-Manage-You has the sole discretion to develop, interpret, and apply any
guidelines and criteria used in determining whether services are medically
reasonable and necessary. All such guidelines and criteria are hereby expressly
incorporated into and made part of the plan and shall constitute the sole basis
on which coverage is defined and upon which medical necessity
determinations are made, and they supersede any and all criteria derived from

6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502, 88 Stat.
829, 891 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132).
7. Cigna Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 441–42 (2011).
8. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869, 891–92 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing Cigna for the proposition that make-whole relief is available in appropriate
circumstances).
9. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
10. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403, 405, 408 (5th Cir. 1991).
11. See, e.g., Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999).
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any source other than this plan, including administrative or judicial decisions
of any jurisdiction.

Finally, what kind of trust is this when fiduciaries always possess a conflict of
interest, 12 and even get to make one, two, three—more?—honest, dumb
mistakes because the courts fear that too onerous oversight will cause plan
sponsors to abandon their plans? 13 In all aspects of this doctrine, there is that
subjunctive with a vengeance: “if an employer chooses to provide health
insurance . . . .”
III. THE PREEMPTION OF SOMETHING BY NOTHING
“All deer are asked to proceed directly into the lion’s den.”
It is helpful to start teaching section 514 preemption by showing how its
three subsections—the “relate to,” “saving” and “deemer” clauses—interact. 14
We liken them to a funnel. If the top, the relate-to clause, is wide, then lots of
state law goes into the preemption funnel. If the top is narrower, then more
state law escapes. Isomorphically, if the saving clause is wide, then plenty of
state laws, as applied to insured plans, go out of the funnel. If both the relateto and saving clauses are wide, then the only real bite of section 514 is the
deemer clause, which means that state law is preempted only as to self-insured
plans, a result that has no rationality at all but follows from the plain-meaning
interpretation the Court initially gave to the relate-to 15 and saving clauses 16 in
its initial forays into the thicket of section 514. This irrationality led to Justice
Blackmun’s deadpanning in MetLife:
The two pre-emption sections, while clear enough on their faces, perhaps are
not a model of legislative drafting, for while the general pre-emption clause
broadly pre-empts state law, the saving clause appears broadly to preserve the
States’ lawmaking power over much of the same regulation. While Congress
occasionally decides to return to the States what it has previously taken away,
17
it does not normally do both at the same time.

12. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008).
13. Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010).
14. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514, 88 Stat.
829, 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144).
15. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983).
16. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 744, 746 (1985).
17. Id. at 739–40. In dissent in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, Justice Stevens wrote:
From the standpoint of the beneficiaries of ERISA plans—who after all are the primary
beneficiaries of the entire statutory program—there is no apparent reason for treating selfinsured plans differently from insured plans. Why should a self-insured plan have a right
to enforce a subrogation clause against an injured employee while an insured plan may
not? The notion that this disparate treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries is
somehow supported by an interest in uniformity is singularly unpersuasive. If Congress
had intended such an irrational result, surely it would have expressed it in straightforward
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That the Supreme Court got off on the wrong foot in interpreting the relateto clause is easily demonstrated with a series of hypotheticals along the lines of
the knee bone is connected to the shin bone, etc. What if Massachusetts taxes
bed sheets? What about its licensure of doctors? Etc.? Why should a civil
rights law such as the New York law at issue in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 18
whose purpose was to prevent discrimination based on pregnancy, ever be
preempted on the grounds that ERISA allows employers doing business in
New York to discriminate against pregnant women as a matter of plan
discretion?
In this regard, Travelers 19 both brought some degree of rationality to
section 514 and made teaching ERISA preemption somewhat easier in that at
least something seems to make sense. It is important to make two points about
Travelers. First, the Court went functional, effectively applying something
akin to conflict preemption in balancing the impact of state law on plan
administration and structure against the nature of the state interest. Second, the
Court did not cut back the preemptive force of section 514 to the subject
matters actually covered by ERISA—reporting, disclosure, vesting, solvency,
procedural rights like full and fair hearings, and fiduciary duties—because it
felt hemmed in by legislative history indicating that section 514 reaches
beyond those core concerns. 20 The latter would have fully brought rationality
to the scope of section 514—but see Pilot Life 21 discussed immediately
below—because state law would be displaced only when necessary for federal
law to be supreme instead of preempting state law even when there is no
federal law. The ERISA vacuum raises its ugly head.
Well, at least that’s how we’ve taught it until last year’s inane decision in
Gobeille, in which the Court held that section 514 preempts Vermont’s
reporting requirement for its all-payer claims database (“APCD”). 22 We could
write at length about this decision—and have 23—but (only!) six points will do

English. At least one would expect that the reasons for drawing such an apparently
irrational distinction would be discernible in the legislative history or in the literature
discussing the legislation.
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 66 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88.
19. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645 (1995).
20. Id. at 656–57.
21. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
22. Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016).
23. See SARA ROSENBAUM & DAVID M. FRANKFORD, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM SECOND EDITION, 2012–2016 UPDATE, 93–103, http://www.westacademic.com/Ut
il/Downloads/FileDownload.aspx?NSIID=1382804 [https://perma.cc/CD6J-UEEU]. Given space
limitations, we greatly simplify. In particular, one can read the various opinions as a holding that
Congress has occupied the field with regard to “reporting.” However, that characterization of the
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here. First, the Court effectively went back to a plain meaning interpretation,
rightly abandoned in Travelers, holding that “reporting” is “reporting” in that it
ignored the fact that the reporting to DOL under ERISA concerns plan
solvency and does not remotely touch on the type of reporting required to
create an APCD. There simply is no federal subject matter involved and the
reasoning in Travelers dictates a contrary result. Second, the Court’s holding is
limited to a core concern, “reporting,” and therefore does not represent an
abandonment of the use of the balancing set up by Travelers to determine
outcomes outside of those core interests. Third, the Court decided that plans
are burdened without any factual record at all. What is this, judicial notice?
Burden is something that must be proven, not just assumed. Fourth, national
uniformity in the administration of multistate plans is a myth, a national legend
used for political purposes to defend exemption from state law. Fifth, how
could the Court state that DOL “may” have power to collect the data to create
APCDs while simultaneously holding that state authority is preempted?
Regardless of the flavor of preemption applied—field, conflict, some special
ERISA variant—state power can be superseded only if federal power exists.
Sixth, the Court may simply be wrong that federal power “may” exist because
it may well not.
Gobeille’s introduction of a new irrationality into ERISA preemption
doctrine would be more troubling if it represented a post-Travelers return to
irrationality but, unfortunately, irrationality never left at all, which brings us to
the saving clause. As with interpretation of the relate-to clause, the Court
initially took a plain-meaning approach to the saving clause. Of course, Justice
Blackmun seriously muddled things when he noted that “[t]his common-sense
view of the matter” was “strongly support[ed]” by the tripart test of McCarranFerguson. 24 It took the Court almost two decades to clean up the problem
created by its reliance on the McCarran-Ferguson test. In Kentucky
Association of Health Plans v. Miller, the Justices told us that those factors do
not all have to be satisfied and the heart of the matter is whether the state law
at issue regulates risk pooling. 25
Well, almost. In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia walked
up to the point that state regulation of insurance is about risk pooling alone
because, after all, insurance is risk pooling—he said as much—but then he
stepped back from that logically compelled conclusion and reinserted the
requirement that to be saved, a state law must be aimed at insurers. Why
should the identity of the entity being regulated matter? In regulating
insurance, states regulate contractual relationships and there is no rhyme or

decision begs the question because one still must define what is meant by “reporting.” We urge
upon you the longer version in the Update.
24. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 740, 742 (1985).
25. See Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339–42 (2003).
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reason to require them to focus a law on one side of the contract or the other.
And why insist on a requirement that is a mere formalism easily evaded by
good drafting? 26 The late Justice Scalia surely understood that he wrote an
opinion that is internally incoherent. Why did he do that? Of course, it is
always perilous to psychoanalyze opinions but we suspect that the Court’s
backing away from going fully functional in interpreting the saving clause—
i.e., making parallel the post-Travelers, post-Kentucky Association analysis of
the relate-to and saving clauses, which, after all, are supposed to be construed
in pari materia—has something to do with Pilot Life. 27
The most important task in teaching Pilot Life is to make sure that the
students understand that Justice O’Connor almost just slid in an independent
basis for preemption, the complete preemption of state law remedies by section
502. We take them through the opinion, in which we seem to be discussing
section 514 preemption and then almost as a sleight of hand Justice O’Connor,
seemingly sensing the shaky ground she is on, shifted the subject to a
discussion of section 502:
Because in this case, the state cause of action seeks remedies for the improper
processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan, our
understanding of the saving clause must be informed by the legislative intent
concerning the civil enforcement provisions provided by ERISA § 502(a), 29
28
U.S.C. § 1132(a).

We suppose that section 502 must have the gravitational pull of a planet,
operating as some sort of last line of defense against an interpretation of
ERISA—whether in the context of insured or self-insured plans—that would
retain employer accountability under state law for negligence or outright bad
faith in connection with the administration of benefits to which their
employees are entitled.
There are almost boundless opportunities to beat up on this opinion,
indicated in part by the number of times words like “surely,” “certainly,” and
“undoubtedly” appear, indicators that nothing is sure, certain, or undoubted—
always worth pointing out to law students. However, to keep discussion
manageable here, we’ll focus on two issues. First, does Mississippi’s cause of
action for bad faith breach of contract relate to an employee benefit plan?
Second, is this cause of action saved as state regulation of insurance? Put
differently, can Pilot Life withstand the reinvention of section 514 wrought by
Travelers and Kentucky Association as balancing states’ long-standing interest
in regulating insurance—the risk-pooling function—against ERISA’s supposed

26. The following hypothetical law supposedly regulates insurers: “No insurer operating in
this state shall . . . .” The following hypothetical law supposedly does not: “No licensed provider
in this state shall execute a contract with any insurer that . . . .”
27. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
28. Id. at 51–52 (emphasis added).
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regulation of the structure and administration of employer-provided insurance,
which we’ve seen is nothing like that described in Justice O’Connor’s words,
“the detailed provisions of [ERISA] § 502(a) [which] set forth a
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of
the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.” 29 Put
differently still, did Justice Scalia write an internally inconsistent opinion in
Kentucky Association to avoid overruling Pilot Life—and while we’re at it, is
perhaps the Court avoiding overturning decades of rulings under sections 502
and 514 by expanding, post-Amara, the availability of make-whole equitable
remedies? Very interesting.
Regarding the post-Travelers interpretation of section 514, Justice
O’Connor’s opinion itself answers the question as she carefully traced the law
of bad faith breach back to 1915, numerous subsequent decisions and
ultimately “firmly planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and
contract law.” 30 Sounds pretty traditional, huh, going back into the writ system
of medieval England? And where is the federal interest asserted in ERISA?
Mandating plan benefits and administration? If the latter is true of
Mississippi’s bad faith breach common law remedy, then any law enforcing
contractual terms would likewise mandate plan benefits and administration.
Thus, once the doctrine has moved away from that road-to-everywhere
interpretation given to section 514 in Shaw, this part of Pilot Life must fall.
Regarding the post-Kentucky Association interpretation of the saving
clause, here’s the sum total of the Court’s reasoning regarding risk pooling:
“Unlike the mandated-benefits law at issue in Metropolitan Life, the
Mississippi common law of bad faith does not effect a spreading of
policyholder risk.” 31 Aside from the fact that it’s always good to ask students
whether something is a step in the reasoning or the conclusion, substantively,
regulating bad faith interpretations of insurance contracts doesn’t affect risk
spreading? Really?
Ask the students to compare two policies. One says, “Policyholder bears
the risk that insurer will act in bad faith in interpreting the provisions of this
policy.” The other: “Insurer bears the risk that it will act in bad faith in
interpreting the provisions of this policy.” Clearly, the same policy, right? Isn’t
part of the risk insured against in an insurance contract that insurers will act in
bad faith, as written into the contract by the state’s boundary laws regulating
insurance? (By the way, there’s that inside-outside distinction again: are the
penal damages for bad faith breach “inside” or “outside” “the plan” because
they are explicitly stated or implied by state law, respectively?). Hence, Justice
29. Id. at 54.
30. Id. at 49–50.
31. Id. at 50.
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O’Connor’s only escape from the conclusion that Mississippi is regulating
insurance is to return to the old saw that state law regulating insurance doesn’t
regulate insurers. Might it be that Justice Scalia hung onto that thin reed in
Kentucky Association to avoid overruling decades of precedent?
IV. QUALITY MATTERS
To understand, finally, that the Court may be making up for the continued
deficiency of its preemption analysis by expanding the monetary damages
available under section 502’s equitable remedies, we first need to address the
lack of quality of its opinions addressing the preemption of state law regulation
of quality in the form of remedies for malpractice. Is the Court creeping toward
consequential damages as a federal remedy while retaining the creepy—(sorry,
we’re writing around the time of Halloween!)—preemption analysis?
Before diving into the preemption cases it is crucial to set the framework
by reminding the students how the imposition of malpractice liability on
managed care organizations (“MCOs”) grew out of an extension of
institutional liability for hospitals to managed care. Cases like Darling, 32
imposing corporate liability against hospitals for their acts, and cases like
Thompson v. Nason Hospital 33 and Jackson v. Powell, 34 holding hospitals
liable for actual or apparent agency and non-delegable duties, were extended to
MCOs for acts like lack of oversight of their doctors, 35 inadequate construction
of networks, 36 improper credentialing, 37 improper financial incentives, 38 errors
in utilization review, 39 and the creation of inadequate practice guidelines or
protocols. 40 Like in the hospital cases, courts in the actions against MCOs have
to sort out who is responsible for harm to a patient. Is it a doctor who simply
botches care, is it the MCO that has structured the process and outcome of
care, or is it some combination of the two?

32. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ill. 1965).
33. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707–08 (Pa. 1991).
34. Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987).
35. See, e.g., Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Boyd v. Albert
Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
36. See, e.g., Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1134 (Ill. 2000).
37. See, e.g., Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999); Pagarigan v.
Aetna U.S. Healthcare of Cal., Inc., No. B167722, 2005 WL 2742807, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
25, 2005); McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992);
Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1231, 1233–34.
38. See, e.g., Pagarigan, 2005 WL 2742807, at *6; Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1992); Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1234.
39. See, e.g., McEvoy v. Grp. Health Coop. of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997);
Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. App. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
40. See, e.g., McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1059; Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1229.
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In some cases, it is arguably clear where cause lay. An impaired surgeon
who can’t see the lines drawn on a patient and operates on the wrong side has
caused the harm. (But even here, couldn’t a proper process of care have
prevented such a blunder, and where were the nurses?). A Medicaid MCO that
has assigned over 4500 children to a solo-practice pediatrician, well over the
number prescribed by Medicaid regulations and over twice as many allowed in
the contract between the MCO and that state Medicaid agency, has caused the
permanent disability of an infant due to untreated meningitis when a frantic
mother’s calls get ignored or she is advised to give castor oil to the baby. 41
(But even here, why did the doctor allow himself to get so overloaded?).
However, almost all the cases, if not all, are in that middle ground in which
the harm has been caused both by the structure and process of care and the
actions or omissions of individuals providing care within that structure and
process. Take the famous case of Wickline, in which the court absolved MediCal of liability because the treating physicians did not sufficiently protest the
utilization review decision to limit further hospitalization to fewer days than
requested. 42 The process involved a breakdown in communication, which was
jointly created by (1) the manner in which Medi-Cal organized its review
process—the relevant form, the MC-180, was inadequately designed to convey
the information that the reviewer, Dr. Glassman, needed; (2) the manner in
which Dr. Glassman, his supervisor, and the on-site nurse, Nurse Futerman,
conducted the process—the MC-180 was unsigned, crucial fields were left
blank, and Dr. Glassman made his decision without looking at any of the
information obtained in the initial authorization of the hospital stay and before
he had even seen the MC-180; and (3) the action of Wickline’s attending
physicians in authorizing the discharge, the manner in which their decisions
were made—which were a mixture of medical considerations in that her
condition had not deteriorated during the four days prior to discharge—as well
as their failure to press their view in the review system, an omission which in
turn may have been induced by Medi-Cal’s repeated denials, making argument
futile. 43 Dr. Glassman, a general surgeon long out of practice and possessing
no knowledge of vascular surgery, only wanted to know whether Wickline had
a fever, could ambulate, defecate, and eat properly. 44 None of this was in the
least relevant to the question regarding the risk of another clot forming at the
site of the synthetic graft, something a vascular surgeon would have readily
perceived. Dr. Glassman was as qualified to make that decision as you or we.
What caused the loss of Wickline’s leg? All of it.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Jones, 730 N.E.2d at 1123.
See Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811, 819.
See id. at 814–15.
Id. at 815.
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In contrast to this inherent messiness of health care, in which decision
making is splintered in a million different directions, preemption analysis is
dichotomous. Malpractice liability against the MCO, providers within its
network, or both either relates to a benefit plan or it does not. The cause of
action either arises under ERISA because it is a suit for benefits due, and
therefore within complete preemption doctrine of Pilot Life, or it is not. How
does one cram the mayhem of health care into the simple categories of ERISA
preemption: plan design/administration/structure/suit for benefits due/action
for breach of ERISA fiduciary duties? Only by drawing distinctions that cannot
hold water.
Take Corcoran, in which the parties argued furiously whether the harm
was caused by a “medical decision” or a “benefit determination,” and the court
accepted the validity of the distinction and ultimately ruled that the case
involved a medical decision incident to a benefit determination. 45 Or take
Pegram, in which the Court distinguished among “pure eligibility,” “treatment
decisions,” and “mixed eligibility-treatment” decisions. 46 Seriously? In some
long ago health care world, aside from the traditional HMOs like Kaiser and
Group Health, health care was financed on the one side, and delivered on the
other, and never the twain shall meet. Even though this separation was always
a fantasy to some extent, the very idea of managed care has been to infuse
medical decision making with financial considerations, and so how can we
have a workable distinction between “medical judgment” and “benefit
administration,” or among “pure eligibility,” “pure treatment” and “mixed
eligibility-treatment” decisions? Of course, the entire need to maintain such
distinctions is driven by the basic nonsense of the relate-to-clause doctrine and
the need to decide whether the cause of harm is “inside” “the plan”—”benefit
administration” aka “pure eligibility”— or “outside”—”medical judgment” aka
“pure treatment.” (Wait a minute, does that mean that “mixed eligibilitytreatment” decisions are somewhere in suspended animation?). Moreover,
there remains Pilot Life and the analogous search to distinguish remedies
“arising under ERISA” from remedies that do not. Inside-outside, yet again.
As we step through the cases, we play with the identity of the decisionmakers and the structure of the decision-making process to show how managed
care wears two hats, blending together plan design/administration/structure/suit
for benefits and due/action for breach of ERISA fiduciary duties (hereinafter
“plan design etc.”), such that it would seem that a plaintiff could seemingly
never avoid complete preemption. But see Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 47

45. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329–31 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
46. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 230–31 (2000).
47. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009
(1995).
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discussed below. Suppose the plaintiff in Corcoran had visited her obstetrician
and he had decided not to hospitalize her. Medical decision and not plan design
etc.? Seems so. But no cause of action against the MCO because it’s utterly
uninvolved. Oh well. Suppose instead that the obstetrician is subject to a
withhold dependent on the number of hospitalizations per year. Medical
decision and not plan design etc.? Hmm. Suppose in addition that profiling is
used and the network is constructed in part based on the number of
hospitalizations per obstetrician per year. Medical decision and not plan design
etc.? Hmmm. Suppose that the obstetrician is following a practice guideline
created by the plan. Medical decision and not plan design etc.? Hmmmm.
When the obstetrician makes his decision within these parameters, is the
situation any different than that in the actual case, in which the plan made a
direct, explicit utilization review decision to substitute a home nursing benefit
for an inpatient admission? Hmmmmm. Don’t plan administrators make
medical decisions? Don’t they make benefit determinations? Don’t physicians
within these plans make medical decisions? Don’t they make benefit
determinations?
In teaching Corcoran, it is worth pointing out that the case was decided
before Travelers and to ask if that makes a difference. Does control over
utilization directly or indirectly through all the tools of managed care affect
plan structure and administration? Yes, you’ve just demonstrated that. But
hasn’t Travelers put state regulation of quality strongly within the you-bettershow-me-the-Congressional-intent-to-displace-state-law side of the world,
other than some state interest bumping up against some Gobeille-esque core
concern? Yes. So, which way does Travelers point? Both ways at once? Now
what? However, given Pilot Life, does any of this even matter? No. See Aetna
Health, Inc. v. Davila. 48
Before proceeding to Davila’s hammer, we explore Pegram a bit to set the
stage. First, help the students see that the result in Pegram was almost
predetermined, for if the Court had held that “mixed eligibility-treatment”
decisions were the acts of ERISA fiduciaries then the federal courts would
have been swamped with a flood of “fiduciary malpractice” litigation, a
prospect that the Court regarded with barely-concealed horror and could not
imagine that Congress intended. 49 Then, ask what does Pegram imply about
the result in Corcoran? Well, the decision in Corcoran was mixed, was it not?
Therefore, it falls outside of ERISA, yes? Then Pegram overrules Corcoran,
right, and state malpractice law should not be preempted? What would be the
effect of having it both ways that “mixed eligibility-treatment” decisions fall
outside of ERISA but state law is nonetheless preempted because of Pilot Life?
The ERISA Vacuum.
48. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
49. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235–37.
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At this point, there is relatively little that needs to be taught with regard to
Davila except to ask, “Well, what about Pegram?” Justice Thomas answered
that MCOs are administrators, in ERISA talk, who are necessarily ERISA
fiduciaries, and therefore any challenges to their actions must be brought under
section 502. 50 See Pilot Life. It’s as simple as that. Really?
So, what’s a plaintiff to do when trying to assert liability against an HMO?
First, a plaintiff could sue the HMO as a fiduciary under section 502, taking
advantage of the window Amara has opened to obtaining monetary damages as
a form of equitable relief. Concurring in Davila because that result was
“consistent with our governing case law on ERISA’s preemptive scope” 51—
i.e., refusing to overrule Pilot Life and its numerous progeny—Justice
Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Breyer, noted that “‘Congress . . .
intended ERISA to replicate the core principles of trust remedy law, including
the make-whole standard of relief.’ I anticipate that Congress, or this Court,
will one day so confirm.” 52 A few years later, with Amara, the Court has
started down that path, to cure at least in part the “‘regulatory vacuum’ [that]
exists . . . [because] . . . ‘state law remedies are preempted but very few federal
substitutes are provided.’” 53
Second, plaintiff can sue the HMO and hope that a court will buy its
argument that the case is not about “benefits due” but about “medical
malpractice”—”quality”—outside of the scope of section 502. 54 Why? “The
statute simply says nothing about the quality of benefits received. . . . Nor does
anything in the legislative history, structure, or purpose of ERISA suggest that
Congress viewed § 502(a)(1)(B) as creating a remedy for a participant injured
by medical malpractice.” 55 And, as Justice Thomas told us in Davila, state
malpractice actions brought because of actions by physicians are
distinguishable from actions brought against HMOs acting as ERISA
fiduciaries, and that’s why Pegram could be distinguished from Davila.
Make sense? No. Arbitrary? Yes. State of the law? Yes.
The basic incoherence of the doctrine, the messiness of the delivery of
health care itself, made exponentially more complicated by fusing delivery
with management, itself organizationally extremely complex, lead to the
distinctions without meaning we have discussed and indeterminate results. The
managed care egg simply cannot be unscrambled and given the basic

50. See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 220–21; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41 (1987).
51. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 222.
52. Id. at 224 (internal citation omitted).
53. Id. at 222.
54. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1009 (1995).
55. Id. at 357.
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conceptual incoherence of what a “plan” consists of and what falls outside of
“the plan,” the result is simply a mess. Clearly, if the plan administrator makes
an across-the-board decision to shape benefits under plan design—e.g.,
exclude all coverage for speech therapy that is not restorative but just
habilitative—ERISA preempts a negligence action arising out of that decision
and brought under state law. The key question is to decide whether a decision
constitutes plan design. Similarly, if a decision is characterized as part of plan
administration performed by one of the number of entities in the managed-care
food chain, then a negligence action arising out of that decision is also
preempted. However, as we have seen in these cases, the characterization
question is by no means clear cut. Dukes leaves us with the distinction between
decisions relating to the “quality” of treatment itself, which are not preempted,
and decisions relating to plan design and administration, which are preempted,
but, as should be clear by now, many decisions affect both quality and finance
simultaneously.
This conceptual problem also intersects with the state-law doctrinal
elements that a plaintiff must satisfy to bring a state-law negligence action
against an entity other than the doctor who ultimately is responsible for
treatment. You have probably realized by now that a plaintiff has a greater
possibility of imposing vicarious liability against an actor in the managed-care
food chain if that actor was more greatly involved in some manner in a
decision directly connected with treatment. However, the dictates of state law,
combined with the doctrine regarding ERISA preemption, puts the plaintiff
between a rock and a hard place because the stronger the claim for assigning
responsibility up the food chain, the greater the chance that the state law will
be preempted.
In the end, the middle ground is simply far too vast. Network formation
and administration are extremely complicated, and the question of the manner
in which these aspects affect a particular decision in a particular case is always
multifaceted. Isn’t assembling an incompetent network directly parallel to a
hospital failing to select its medical staff with reasonable care? Why is one
type of misconduct classified as plan design or administration while the other
is corporate medical negligence? Think about the layer upon layer of
contracting parties that exist in many if not most managed care networks. At
any layer, financial incentives may be involved, guidelines created and
deployed, providers profiled, providers selected and deselected, ongoing care
supervised to differing degrees and among various parties, pay-forperformance imposed, quality reporting used, and so on, and so on, and so on.
Suppose a plaintiff can link an adverse event to some of these actions as
influencing the treatment provided or not provided. Imposition under state law
of vicarious or corporate liability is totally fact dependent, sensitive to the
degree to which there was actual control of the treating physician, whether
apparent authority was conveyed to the patient, or whether corporate
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responsibility should be imposed for the situation created by some entity in the
managed-care food chain. Indeed, because the structures of these layer cakes
are so variable, the question whether there is “any there, there” up above in the
food chain—any sort of institutionalization that we can say makes appropriate
the analogy of imposing vicarious or corporate liability in hospitals—is
enormously fact-sensitive. The same is true, then, whether a claim can be
characterized as involving “quality” or “benefit determination.” Distinctions
regarding what it is “inside” or “outside” “the plan” are vapid, as are those that
attempt to separate remedies arising under section 502 from those that do not.
The result is a total zoo.
CONCLUDING MATTERS
And so, we’ve come to the end of the matter. Perhaps the deer aren’t out of
the headlights but at least they understand better where they are and that they
have the entire legal community to keep them company in the blinding glare.
As Alice might have described ERISA doctrine: “If I had a world of my own,
everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it is, because
everything would be what it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be.
And what it wouldn’t be, it would. You see?” 56 In the end, as in the beginning,
we ask that students—readers more generally—please do not kill the
messengers.

56. ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Disney Pictures 1951).

